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Abstract
A mobilised citizenry is a threat to corrupt operations. Therefore, those involved in 
behaviours potentially  labelled as corrupt have an interest in minimising public 
outrage. Five ways of doing this are to hide the activity, denigrate opponents, 
reinterpret actions as legitimate, use official channels to give an appearance of justice, 
and intimidate or bribe people involved. A local government scandal in Wollongong, 
Australia, illustrates all these tactics, with public hearings and media coverage 
providing volumes of revealing information. The implication of this analysis is that 
anti-corruption efforts should emphasise ways of increasing public outrage.
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Introduction
“Sex and corruption” — it was a top news story. The opening day of the hearings, 18 
February 2008, brought out sizzling details about Wollongong City Council, the local 
government body  for the city of Wollongong, south of Sydney. Beth Morgan had 
worked for the council as a senior development officer with authority  to approve 
development applications. She approved several buildings that grossly violated 
planning guidelines at the same time as having affairs with three different developers. 
Morgan planned to leave the council and set up her own business and was establishing 
a clientele. As well as sex, money  played a major role. One of the developers, Frank 
Vellar, plied Morgan with gifts.
 The Independent Commission Against Corruption, a statutory body in the state 
of New South Wales, had been tipped off about dodgy operations in Wollongong and 
started an investigation in 2006 that included telephone taps, video surveillance and 
seizure of computers to obtain e-mails. The opening statement at ICAC’s 2008 
hearings used the information gathered to spell out a damning case of a pro-
development government body that eased the path for developers with inside access.
 There was more. Two men — referred to in the media as “conmen,” as they  
had been to prison for fraud — posed as ICAC staff or as having influence with ICAC 
and approached various developers, council staff and politicians soliciting bribes to 
thwart the investigation. Morgan gave them $50,000, Vellar gave them at least 
$100,000 — the two men obtained a total of half a million dollars. 
 The core feature of corruption revealed in the Wollongong scandal — 
developers offering inducements (bribes) to local politicians and government officials 
to obtain favours — is typical of local government corruption across Australia. 
Sometimes the bribes take the form of donations to political parties or campaigns. The 
Wollongong case, unlike others, was documented by an extended covert  investigation 
and received extensive local media coverage following public hearings. 
 Corruption is most commonly studied from the point of view of economics or 
politics or both, with a focus on structures. In a market picture, the structures involve 
either incentives for or deterrents to corruption; in a political-system picture, the 
structures are laws, policies and systems of government. Researchers also debate 
definitions, prevalence and consequences of corruption and ways to address it (Jain 
Resistance Studies Magazine 2012-01     From: rsmag.org
2
2001; Lambsdorff et al. 2005; Rose-Ackerman 1978, 1999). Here, I introduce a 
different perspective, complementary to the usual structural approach. 
 One of the common questions by researchers and concerned citizens is why 
corruption persists. In other words, if most people think corruption is wrong, how do 
perpetrators get away with it? To tackle this question, I look at the tactics of outrage 
management.
 To call something corrupt is to label it as wrong or inappropriate. When an 
activity is widely  seen as wrong, perpetrators are at risk of being exposed, 
condemned, shunned and prosecuted. In short, people are outraged. People who are 
seriously concerned may decide to take action: to speak out, band together, call in 
supporters, get authorities on side or take direct action. Popular outrage can be a 
serious threat to perpetrators. To continue with their activity, they  need to minimise 
this sort of reaction. How can they do this?
 Studies in a wide range of areas show that perpetrators commonly use five 
sorts of methods to minimise public outrage (Martin 2007):
 • cover up the activity
 • devalue the target
 • reinterpret the activity, including by lying, minimising consequences, 
blaming others and reframing
 • use official channels to give an appearance of justice
 • intimidate and bribe people involved.
These are methods available to powerful perpetrators, for example bosses who bully 
subordinates, managers who attack whistleblowers, police who beat citizens, 
militaries that shoot civilian protesters, and governments that license torture. 
However, sometimes these methods fail and the action backfires on the perpetrator. 
Examples include the beating of Rodney King in 1991 that backfired on the Los 
Angeles police (Martin 2005), the massacre of protesters in Dili, East Timor in 1991 
that backfired on the Indonesian government (Martin 2007) and the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq that backfired on the US government (Martin 2004). In each of these cases, the 
perpetrators used all five methods listed above to inhibit adverse reactions, but — 
unusually — the methods were not sufficient and massive public outrage ensued. 
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 Using this framework, the Wollongong scandal can be analysed as a case in 
which corruption backfired. Beth Morgan, for example, instead of gaining clients for 
her prospective business, lost her job, had her reputation destroyed and may be 
subject to criminal charges. Local politicians named in the investigation were thrown 
out of their offices and are likely to be unelectable in the future due to the adverse 
publicity.
 Cases in which injustice backfires are valuable for probing the mechanisms 
normally used for inhibiting outrage. For example, a close study  of the beating of 
Rodney King reveals several methods that dampened public concern. Some of these 
methods, notably cover-up and intimidation, are found in many other, lower-profile 
police beatings; other methods used in the case, such as formal inquiries and court 
cases, are unusual in police beatings (Martin 2005). In the King beating case, the 
methods used by the police were insufficient to prevent a major public outcry, but that 
is not  the main point here. Because the case received saturation media coverage, 
including books written by partisans on each side, there is far more documentation 
about what happened than in a run-of-the-mill police beating. The same phenomenon 
can be observed in other major backfires, such as the Dili massacre and the invasion 
of Iraq.
 The Wollongong corruption scandal has the same characteristics as other 
backfires: it  is atypical precisely because corruption was counterproductive for the 
perpetrators, and the ICAC investigation and massive publicity  made available 
information about the dynamics of corruption that  is normally hidden. The events in 
Wollongong therefore provide a window into methods normally used to inhibit  public 
outrage over corruption.
 Corruption can involve many different  methods. For example, money 
laundering, one process in some corrupt operations, involves portraying illegally 
obtained funds as legal. My intention here is not to document a wide range of 
practical techniques but  rather to focus on dimensions that operate to inhibit  public 
outrage. Most of the techniques of money laundering fit into the category of cover-up; 
the final destination of laundered money, an apparently legitimate business, might 
also fit into the category of an official channel that gives only an appearance of 
honesty. The techniques used in corrupt operations can vary quite a lot from situation 
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to situation. The aim here is to note commonalities that arise through the goal or 
outcome of inhibiting public concern.
 This framework offers guidance for challenging corruption through increasing 
public outrage. Each of the five methods of inhibiting outrage can be countered:
 • expose the activity
 • validate the targets and devalue the perpetrators
 • interpret the activity as unfair
 • mobilise public support; don’t rely on official channels
 • resist and expose intimidation and bribery.
These are not the only  methods for opposing corruption; there are also many 
approaches to prevention such as design of financial systems. These five methods are 
oriented to outrage dynamics.
 In this paper, I address each of the five methods of inhibiting outrage over 
corruption and corresponding methods of increasing outrage: cover-up versus 
exposure; devaluation versus validation; interpretation struggles; official channels 
versus public mobilisation; and intimidation and bribery  versus resistance. 
Concerning each method, I offer some general comments and then give examples 
from the Wollongong corruption scandal, in the process gradually  telling more about 
the Wollongong case. In the conclusion, I summarise the value of focusing on outrage 
management in studying and dealing with corruption. 
 In giving examples of tactics, I draw heavily  on transcripts of ICAC’s public 
hearings (ICAC 2008a), and newspaper reports of the hearings, especially in 
Wollongong’s daily paper, the Illawarra Mercury. The 1000-page hearing transcripts 
are a rich source of information but at  the same time are limited in scope. A more 
comprehensive investigation involving extensive interviews would undoubtedly 
uncover far more information and give a more accurate picture of operations in 
Wollongong, but much of such information could not be published because of 
Australia’s restrictive defamation laws (Pullan 1994). 
 Before turning to methods of inhibiting outrage, I first give some background 
information about Wollongong. This is not intended to be a full account of the 
Wollongong corruption story, much less the wider history of Wollongong politics. 
Instead, I use the Wollongong example to illustrate tactics of outrage management. 
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Wollongong background
Wollongong is a city on the Pacific coast 80km south of Sydney. Its population of 
280,000 makes it the third largest city in the state of New South Wales. 
 Australia is divided into local government areas called councils. Wollongong 
Council is responsible for about two-thirds of the population of Wollongong; the 
remaining third, in the south, is in the jurisdictions of Shellharbour Council and 
Kiama Council.
 Local governments have various responsibilities, from garbage collection to 
library services. The key  issue here is property  development. A homeowner who 
wants to build a house extension needs council approval. Special favours can be given 
at this level: knowing the right person might help  in gaining prompt approval. Another 
possibility is that an outspoken resident might be targeted with extra scrutiny and 
made to take down or rebuild constructions that are trivially  in violation of guidelines. 
In short, the power of approval is a possible avenue for corruption and abuse of 
power. 
 In the Wollongong corruption scandal, the focus was on bigger fish: approvals 
for major developments involving millions or tens of millions of dollars. Getting 
approval in violation of guidelines can lead to windfall profits. Indeed, getting 
approval at all can make the difference between a loss — the expenditure of 
considerable time and money simply making the application — and a normal profit 
margin.
 Development applications — abbreviated DAs — are put to the council, where 
planners check for compliance with rules and regulations. The planners are paid staff. 
There is another layer to the approval process: the elected officials, known as 
councillors. “Wollongong Council” can refer to the body of councillors or to the paid 
staff, or both. Major DAs need approval by the councillors.
 From 2004–8, Wollongong had 13 councillors, seven from the Labor Party and 
six independents. Wollongong is the largest working-class city in Australia; its major 
industry is Australia’s only integrated steelworks. The region has a long history of 
support for the Labor Party and left-wing unionism. However, following the recession 
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in the early  1980s, when the steelworks nearly closed, there has been a push for 
tourism and property development to complement the region’s industrial base.
 In New South Wales, Labor was in power from 1995 to 2011. Until the 2011 
election, most state members of parliament from Wollongong were members of the 
Australian Labor Party, something simply taken for granted because the seats are so 
strongly Labor. State-level politics is relevant in a couple of ways: Wollongong 
Council does not  have full say over developments because state planning regulations 
play  a restraining role; and Wollongong members of state parliament can become 
involved in local planning issues. Labor was also in power federally  so, for 
Wollongong residents, all three levels of government were Labor-controlled. For 
reference purposes, Appendix 1 lists key figures in the scandal and Appendix 2 the 
main sorts of corrupt or inappropriate conduct alleged to have occurred.
 With this background, I now turn to methods by which corrupt operators can 
minimise public concern about their activities, looking in turn at cover-up, 
devaluation, reinterpretation, official channels and intimidation. In each section 
devoted to one of these methods, I first outline some general features of the method 
and then give illustrations from the Wollongong scandal. In each section I also discuss 
ways of increasing public concern, namely  through exposure, validation, 
interpretation, civic mobilisation and resistance.
Cover-up versus exposure
Concealment is standard procedure for much crime and corruption. Things defined as 
criminal are stigmatised, with penalties for transgressors, so it makes sense to avoid 
detection. House thieves, for example, prefer to operate when no one is home and to 
leave few clues about their identity. The importance of cover-up can be inferred from 
the infrequency with which participants in potentially dubious activities are willing to 
tell all and sundry. This point is obvious but warrants emphasis when it comes to 
analysing outrage dynamics.
 When activities are normalised, then concealment may no longer be necessary. 
Taxation has sufficient legitimacy to be administered openly  whereas illegal tax 
avoidance is concealed (Levi 1988). A useful test of the legitimacy of practices is how 
openly  they  are carried out. In some countries, paying officials to avoid prosecution is 
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standard practice. If such behaviour is to be labelled corrupt, then it is suitably called 
institutionalised corruption.
 Cover-up is commonly selective: some people know what is going on but 
activities are concealed from wider audiences. For example, operators of cartels know 
what they  are doing but this is not advertised to consumers. In many cases, members 
of the public may know in general terms that corruption occurs but seldom have it 
thrust in their faces. Vivid personal experience is more likely to cause outrage and 
generate active opposition to criminal activities. 
 Now consider the role of cover-up in the Wollongong saga. The key corrupt 
activity was collusion between developers and city  officials to give special treatment 
to the applications by selected developers in exchange for cash or other perquisites. 
Beth Morgan knew about her own affairs with developers, obviously  enough. Some of 
her co-workers knew or suspected. But few outsiders knew anything. 
 While information was kept away  from wider audiences, insiders obtained 
extra information. For example, Morgan released confidential council documents to 
developers. 
 Many people in Wollongong, especially those concerned about the impacts of 
local development on environmental and social amenity, believed corruption existed 
— this is a well-known problem in Australia — but few would have had any detailed 
information. According to a newspaper story, “One former colleague [of Morgan’s] 
said ‘everyone’ knew things were bad but the extent of the bribery and corruption 
claims were a shock, even to them.” (Carty and Trenwith 2008). The result of cover-
up was a layered access to knowledge: those directly involved were fully  aware of 
their activities, some close at hand knew there were problems but did not have details, 
some citizens had generalised concerns and many others were blissfully ignorant. A 
few individuals obtained specific knowledge via leaks from insiders to the media and 
community members.
 This sort of layered knowledge, and a corresponding layered ignorance, is 
likely to be found in other forms of corruption. The importance of restricting 
awareness of corrupt activities is that it limits the possibility of a mobilised 
opposition. Those who are personally  involved are unlikely to speak out; those who 
are not involved but close at hand, such as Morgan’s co-workers, may be silenced 
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through other techniques, as discussed later; and those more removed do not have 
enough information to act upon. The wider public is unlikely to become very 
concerned, at least not enough to interrupt the corrupt activities.
 The ICAC hearings revealed some details about techniques of cover-up.
 • When council general manager Rod Oxley met with developers, no file notes 
were made (43). (Numbers in brackets refer to page numbers in transcripts of the 
ICAC hearings (ICAC 2008a).)
 • Morgan did not disclose any  gifts she received from developers, despite a 
council policy requiring disclosure (52).
 • Morgan, handling a major DA by Glen Tabak, managed to get it approved 
without going through wider scrutiny by councillors that is mandated when a 
development is a matter of “community  interest.” She phoned Tabak about this and 
said “Glen, it went under the radar in terms of community interest hence was able to 
be dealt with swiftly and without interference.” This call was recorded by ICAC 
investigators. ICAC lawyer Noel Hemmings, questioning Morgan, asked “That’s why 
you handled the application in the way  you did, isn’t  it?” She answered yes. 
Hemmings then asked “You wanted it to go under the radar so the community 
wouldn’t know what was going on?” She replied that there appeared to be little 
“community interest compared to the size of the application” (53).
 • Documents about the Quattro development were missing (107).
 • Morgan disguised her role by  using a co-worker’s computer to register her 
approval of a DA (112).
 • Morgan emailed Vellar confidential council documents as a blind copy 
recipient, preventing the named recipients from knowing he received them (220).
 • Councillor Val Zanotto sent emails to Vellar under the name “Franco 
Magnagotti” (220). Whatever the justification, this reduced the possibility  of outsiders 
seeing their connection. Zanotto said to Vellar that he had to be careful in his 
conversations with him (670–671). Vellar’s name was recorded as Gato.
 • Zanotto, in a Council meeting, led the argument in favour of one of Vellar’s 
developments without revealing his relationship with Vellar (676).
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 • Vellar requested that Morgan be removed from assessing a DA — the 
Bathers’ Pavillion — to avoid his connection with her being revealed (McInerney 
2008, 21 February: 4). 
 • When manager Joe Scimone left his job at the Council, he signed a 
confidentiality agreement, which served to keep details out of the public eye (531).
 • When Scimone gave $30,000 to Younan, he left the money  on the seat of 
Younan’s car (911). If their meeting was being filmed, this eliminated a more obvious 
handover of the money.
 These examples show that cover-up can occur in many different ways and be 
oriented to different audiences. Some individuals hid or disguised their activities — 
meetings with developers or the identity  of people they called — to reduce awareness 
of their personal involvement. In other cases, the main target was the wider 
community, as in Morgan’s successful effort to avoid Tabak’s DA having to receive 
scrutiny as a matter of community interest.
The counter-tactic to cover-up is exposure. So how can corruption be exposed? 
Usually there are quite a few people who know about it, but the closer they are to the 
centre of the operations, the less likely they are to challenge it. Occasionally  a key 
player turns informant; such a super-grass can be a powerful tool against corrupt 
operations. More commonly though, exposure involves a parallel layered process, 
with a few who are closer to the action revealing some of what’s happening to a 
slightly wider group, some of whom take it more widely still. If enough credible 
sources are available, media may take up the story, publicising the matter widely. This 
general process is sometimes short-circuited via a deep exposure from a high-level 
informant or a probing investigation.
 In Wollongong, the process of exposure involved both residents and ICAC. 
Over the years, residents had made many submissions to ICAC requesting 
investigations into council activities, so ICAC officials should have known about 
corrupt conduct in Wollongong. Though the specific trigger is not publicly known, 
ICAC initiated a covert investigation, including phone taps and, later, seizure of 
computers to obtain e-mails, collecting a mass of damning information. ICAC then 
prepared for a series of public hearings at which key figures — especially the so-
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called “people of interest,” namely those suspected of serious corruption — were 
compelled to testify. Some of them started off by lying, attempting to hide their 
involvement by denying it, but ICAC investigators then brought out  damning 
information exposing these lies, encouraging some of those testifying to admit to 
some of their activities. 
 The ICAC hearings were public, making them ideal for media stories. There 
were headlines and follow-up stories in the main local newspaper, the Illawarra 
Mercury, day after day. Closed hearings and a confidential report would have limited 
public outrage. ICAC’s open hearings, with transcripts and reports published on the 
web, maximised public impact.
 Several possible methods of exposure were not prominent in the Wollongong 
case. No high-level insider went public about corruption: there were no 
whistleblowers who went directly to the media. (The one partial exception was 
council employee Vicki Curran who complained about sexual harassment from 
manager Joe Scimone. Her complaints helped lead to creation of the citizens’ group 
Wollongong Against Corruption, discussed later.)
 Normal management processes did not address the problems: in many 
respects, they  were part of the problem. Investigative journalists were not the primary 
instigators of exposure. The Wollongong case thus does not  reveal all possible means 
of exposure: it simply shows one actual means — an external investigation, public 
hearings and media coverage — and, more importantly, the importance of exposing 
corruption to the public as a means of creating outrage and challenging the corrupt 
processes. 
 In summary, cover-up is a crucial method used to inhibit outrage about crime 
and corruption. Cover-up is layered: some people know a lot about operations, 
whereas large numbers know little or nothing. Successful corruption relies on a 
disjunction between knowledge, concern and willingness to act. Those closest to the 
action are typically part  of the corruption, compromised or fearful; those furthest  from 
the action typically do not know enough to become concerned or take effective action.
Resistance Studies Magazine 2012-01     From: rsmag.org
11
Devaluation and validation
The status of a victim affects how people feel about an action. People think murder is 
bad in the abstract; in practice, they  usually care more about the murder of a respected 
surgeon than of a serial killer. Devaluing the target therefore is a powerful way  of 
reducing concern about actions taken. Devaluation can occur through prior prejudice 
such as racism or by active measures including labelling, malicious rumours and 
frame-ups.
 Powerful groups have the greatest capacity to devalue others: governments can 
label someone a terrorist; police can charge people with crimes; a boss can make 
demeaning comments about subordinates. 
 The question then arises: do corrupt operators have the capacity to devalue 
others? With institutionalised corruption, the answer is yes, because powerful groups 
are complicit. With petty corruption, the answer is usually  no. In intermediate 
situations, corrupt operators and their allies have a significant but restricted capacity 
for devaluation, for example limited to particular individuals.
 In Wollongong, there were two main types of devaluation. The first  was close 
at hand, within the council: when planners made recommendations against 
developments but Oxley  applied pressure to find a way to approve them, this could be 
taken as an implicit devaluation of the planners’ expertise.
 The second form of devaluation arose out of the pro-development ideology  
promoted by  key politicians and council officials. In 2004, a story  in the Illawarra 
Mercury began “Wollongong City  Council general manager Rod Oxley has blasted 
the performance of planning staff in dealing with development applications.” The 
article quoted Oxley  as saying “It’s about time these professional planners acted 
professionally … they are not operating as effectively  and efficiently as they should 
be. It’s been going on for far too long.” (Anon 2004). This was a remarkable public 
attack by  a manager on his subordinates. The context was public criticism of Oxley by 
a community activist based on memos and emails from Oxley urging approval of a 
particular development (Field 2004).
 Devaluation occurred in the same sort of layered approach as with cover-up. 
Closest to corrupt operations was where the most serious and effective forms of 
devaluation could occur, targeted at individuals. Further out, devaluation mainly took 
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the form of labelling as anti-development those who were critical of specific 
developments or who expected greater citizen participation in decision-making.
 As a general rule, when opponents of corruption are specific targets of overt 
techniques of devaluation, it is likely  that corruption is entrenched. This is opposite to 
the pattern for cover-up: institutionalised corruption is characterised by less cover-up 
and more overt devaluation.
 The corruption in Wollongong was mostly covert, so opportunities for 
devaluation of corruption opponents was limited. At the ICAC hearings, there is little 
evidence of devaluation, probably because those being questioned were under 
scrutiny: they  were hardly in a position to launch attacks on the character of their 
accusers. One incident in the hearings illustrates how devaluation can operate. Most 
of those called to testify  were represented by lawyers, and the lawyers were given an 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Oxley’s lawyer, in questioning David Broyd 
— the council planner who tried to resist pressures from Oxley and whose testimony 
was damaging to Oxley — tried to discredit Broyd by referring to a DA that Broyd 
had approved, apparently  against the guidelines (572ff). If Broyd could be shown to 
have sanctioned violation of guidelines, even on a minor matter, then his claims 
against Oxley  would lose force — at least that is the process by which devaluation 
tends to operate.
 The counter to devaluation is validating those opposed to corruption. The 
more that opponents are perceived as honest, interested primarily in the public good, 
esteemed for their achievements and seen as peers, the more credibility they are likely 
to have and the harder it  will be to devalue them. A whistleblower, for example, will 
have greater credibility by dressing conservatively, speaking in a calm and dignified 
fashion and not appearing to seek personal advantage or vengeance.
 In Wollongong, it  is hard to see how validation processes played out inside 
council — the evidence is not available. In the public arena, anti-corruption citizen 
groups gained credibility  through having participants from different political parties 
and occupations, showing that they were not  partisan enterprises, as discussed later. 
 For opponents of corruption, it is important to involve individuals who are 
well regarded and free of taint, especially as spokespeople. If challengers can be 
tarred with even minor misdemeanours, it greatly damages their credibility, under the 
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common but mistaken assumption that only honest people have the right to challenge 
dishonesty. The reputations of challengers therefore become prime targets for attack, 
which often occurs via rumours, anonymous letters and emails, and information 
leaked to the media.
Interpretation struggles
Actions do not come with labels such as “corrupt” or “honest” but instead have to be 
interpreted. What counts as crime and corruption is subject to interpretation at 
individual and collective levels. 
 There are many techniques for explaining behaviour that  might be labelled 
corrupt. Four important techniques for minimising concern and outrage are lying, 
minimising, blaming and framing. 
 Lying is the most obvious way to change someone’s view of a situation. Lying, 
as defined by researchers, includes both telling falsehoods and withholding the truth 
(Ekman 2001). However, many people believe that  withholding the truth is not lying, 
so they are careful to avoid overt falsehoods even as they are quite deceptive by not 
expressing what they know.
 Lying — especially  lying by omission — is a means of cover-up. But if 
someone knows that something has happened, lying gives a particular take on what 
happened. For example, when Morgan did not reveal her relationships with 
developers, this was cover-up; when Morgan’s colleague Ron Zwicker challenged her 
about having an affair with Vellar, she denied it — she told a falsehood (73).
 Developer Glen Tabak paid for plastering work on Morgan’s unit. Morgan 
wrote him a cheque in payment and he gave her cash, thereby making the gift appear 
to be a business transaction: “Glen wanted me to write a cheque in case anybody 
asked to make it look legitimate” (65).
 Testimony at ICAC hearings provides a rich lode of material about lying — or 
suspected lying. In many cases, conclusive proof about events was not available, but 
patterns and circumstantial evidence made claims by witnesses dubious. 
 There was an extra dimension at the hearings: perjury. Witnesses had to swear 
to tell the truth and were compelled to answer questions, though self-incriminating 
responses under such conditions could not be used in subsequent court  cases. 
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However, lying at the hearings was a crime and, in principle, could be prosecuted. 
Here are some examples concerning (alleged) lying.
 • Oxley denied any involvement in a particular DA. This was false according 
to Morgan (116).
 • Morgan admitted lying to ICAC in questioning prior to the hearings 
(163-165). 
 • In one of Vellar’s phone conversations intercepted by ICAC, he said Oxley 
“should be put away.” However, he denied he had meant Oxley  could go to jail for 
corruption (263–264).
 • Vellar denied asking for approval of his DA via planner John Gilbert. It  is 
worth expanding on this example to show the challenge in pinning down an alleged 
lie.
 In the ICAC hearings, Noel Hemmings asked Vellar “Had you asked Mr 
Gilbert to have his computer used to record the consent so that Ms Morgan’s name 
would not appear on it?” Vellar answered “No, I did not.” Hemmings, to limit Vellar’s 
room to manoeuvre, asked “Did you have a conversation on that line?” Vellar: “No I 
did not” (206). 
 At this point a recording was played of a conversation between Gilbert, 
Morgan and Vellar. Hemmings then asked “I asked you questions as to whether you 
had made any application to Mr Gilbert or Mr Oxley that the application be signed by 
him and not Ms Morgan. Do you recall that?” Vellar: “Yes.” Hemmings: “And you 
denied it?” Vellar: “Because I did not recollect what you had asked me.” Hemmings: 
“You didn’t  recollect?” Vellar: “You had asked me, I believe a question that  I did not 
understand correctly. By playing the tape I have heard now what you were asking 
me.” (207) Vellar has avoided admitting to a lie.
 A bit later, Hemmings asked, “Were you concerned about the possible linking 
of Beth Morgan with the Quattro application?” Vellar: “I was concerned that not the 
linking [sic], but I wanted her superior to look over the application.” Hemmings: “You 
wanted her name not to appear?” Vellar: “No, I wanted her superior to look over the 
application.”
 At this point  the ICAC Commissioner, Jerrold Cripps, asked “Why did it  have 
to be signed by him, why couldn’t she sign it if that’s all you were worried about?” 
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Vellar: “I didn’t — I didn’t want the relationship between Beth and I to interfere with 
this application.” 
 Hemmings leaped on this admission: “But you knew it had interfered with this 
application?” “The relationship?” “Yes?” “I guess so.” Hemmings: “You guess so, 
you knew so. She was doing favours for you, was she not?” Vellar: “No, she was not 
doing favours for me” (208). This was all Hemmings needed on this point.
 This interchange illustrates how a witness can wriggle out of an open 
admission of lying. Vellar first  denied a conversation, then claimed he hadn’t 
understood the question, then claimed he asked that Gilbert sign the application 
because Vellar just wanted him to read it, and finally  indirectly admitted that  his 
relationship  with Morgan, if known, might hurt the application — but denied Morgan 
was doing him favours. For Hemmings, Vellar was a moving target, changing his 
explanations along the way.
 The interchange also illustrates the power of evidence — in this case 
intercepted telephone calls — in challenging lies and forcing witnesses into 
admissions. Here I’ve quoted only a small portion of the testimony on this point. The 
interchange illustrates how hard it is to pin witnesses down and hence the enormous 
effort required by ICAC questioners to gain traction on even a small point on which 
evidence obtained by ICAC — recordings of telephone conversations — appears 
conclusive. If it is this difficult  to obtain admissions when there is damning evidence 
and the threat of a perjury  charge, the ease of face-saving lies and omissions on other 
occasions can be imagined.
 Sometimes the ICAC questioners directly accused witnesses of lying, but 
witnesses often persisted in their claims although the evidence of deceit seemed 
overwhelming. For example, when Tabak said he never discussed DAs at the Table of 
Knowledge — the colloquial term for an outdoor table at a local kebab shop where 
developers regularly  met, sometimes joined by council staff — Hemmings said this 
was a lie, but Tabak denied it was (272–273). Gerald Carroll denied extorting money, 
instead saying that he and Younan were helping Vellar and Morgan with legal referrals 
and that Younan had manipulated him (932). After an intercepted telephone 
conversation was played, Carroll said it could be interpreted as bribery, but it wasn’t 
(935). Hemmings eventually  accused Carroll of telling “a pack of lies” and 
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Commissioner Cripps made equivalent accusations (941, 942; Trenwith 2008: 5 
March).
 Despite intense questioning, witnesses only  rarely admitted to lying. Morgan 
(165) and Tabak (328) are two who did. The more common approach was to deny 
allegations, as suggested by advice given by Scimone in an email produced by ICAC: 
“deny, deny, deny” (Trenwith 2008: 27 February).
 Another approach is to deny understanding of what is going on. Developer 
Glen Tabak appeared to use this approach, though it is impossible to know whether he 
was lying or simply ignorant. He said that when he was having an affair with Beth 
Morgan, he didn’t know she was the assessment officer for his DA (291). She said he 
gave her cash; he denied it (294). He denied knowing the meaning of “community 
consultation” or what Morgan meant by saying his DA had gone “under the radar” to 
avoid a community consultation (298–299). He said he didn’t know why Morgan was 
sending him emails (302). And he said he was unaware of a $750,000 payment 
suddenly required in relation to one of his properties (307–308). In the Illawarra 
Mercury, journalist Paul McInerney wrote that “For a man who has poured millions of 
dollars into building projects in Wollongong, developer Glen Tabak has a lamentably 
poor grasp of the planning system. And a memory  that  at times threatened the 
patience of ICAC commissioner Jerrold Cripps and his senior counsel Noel 
Hemmings” (McInerney 2008: 22 February).
 Vellar, in his first round of testimony, seldom claimed he couldn’t remember 
things. However, in a later appearance, he said he didn’t remember his affair with 
Morgan occurring at a particular time even when prompted by presentation of 
Morgan’s emails at the time (598–599). He received confidential rezoning 
information but said he couldn’t recall who gave it to him (612). He said he didn’t 
know why  he had said, in an intercepted message, that he had been tipped off — even 
after being warned about lying (617). 
 Councillor Val Zanotto also claimed ignorance. In a call to Vellar, Zanotto said 
he (Zanotto) had to be careful but claimed he didn’t know why he said it (670–671).
 Minimising the consequences is another method of interpretation. Roy 
Baumeister (1997) studied ways of thinking by perpetrators of horrific crimes and 
found that they nearly always considered the impact of their actions on victims was 
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far less than what the victims themselves felt. So when perpetrators minimise the 
consequences, they can be sincere.
 Scimone said he didn’t mention his friendship  with developer Tabak because it 
wasn’t “material to the discussion” (896). Councillor Kiril Jonovski initially denied 
meeting Vellar in October 2006. When evidence of his knowledge of the meeting was 
presented, he said he didn’t recall it because it was a “non-event” (855). It is 
reasonable to presume that those involved in corruption commonly rationalise their 
behaviour, to themselves, by perceiving the impacts on others as minimal or deserved 
(Bandura 1986: 375–389). 
 Blaming others is a useful way to deflect  outrage. Powerful perpetrators find it 
useful when bit players are targeted for opprobrium. Drug syndicates are not seriously 
damaged by  arrest and prosecution of users or local suppliers: the attention is focused 
away from the main players.
 Morgan said “because of the city  centre revitalization policy we were told not 
to use the policy” — and said it was “Managers at Council” who told her that (38). 
She also said concerning General Manager Rod Oxley that development approvals 
were not made according to regulations but instead according to “Whatever Rod 
wanted” (76). 
 ICAC in its investigation identified a number of “people of interest,” namely 
those suspected of involvement in corruption. In its final report, it recommended 
prosecution of specific individuals such as Beth Morgan and Frank Vellar. All those 
named in this way were local politicians, council officials or developers. Yet there 
were connections to state politics. For example, media stories exposed Noreen Hay, a 
member of state parliament representing Wollongong. However, ICAC declined to 
name her as a person of interest. ICAC’s approach of singling out  local individuals 
had the effect of blaming them for problems while leaving more powerful politicians 
at the state level out of the picture.   
 Framing is looking at the world through a lens or perspective. Participants in 
operations have much to gain by framing their activities as normal rather than corrupt. 
 Beth Morgan gave a number of reasons why she approved applications that 
violated Council guidelines, including that unlawful approvals were okay because 
making similar approvals “had been done before and nothing had ever been said about 
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it” (58) and that the policies were going to change (75). She said Frank Vellar wanted 
her as the assessment officer for his applications because he thought she was a good 
planner (71). It was only under relentless questioning that she retreated from these 
rationalisations and admitted she shouldn’t have approved the developments.
 Those who say  it is okay for property  developers to have special connections 
with local government officials — for example by making donations to politicians — 
have framed the issue in a manner helpful to corrupt dealings. 
 Interpretation is carried out principally through language, so it is useful to look 
at words used. The words “gift” and “donation” have favourable connotations; to call 
the same action a “bribe” implies corruption. Those testifying before ICAC used a 
variety of words to give a softer, more favourable interpretation of their actions.
 Vellar gave Morgan a trip to a ski resort. He said the trip  was “recreational,” 
not a reward for approving his DA (198–199; McInerney 2008, 21 February: 3). He 
said he gave Morgan cash “because she was destitute” (200). He said a false statement 
by him was an “error” (258). When Zanotto gave him $150,000, Vellar called this a 
“loan” (259; Cox 2008, 21 February). Deceptive framing can be thought of as a 
method of lying; distinguishing between framing and lying in part depends on an 
assessment of intention, which may be unknowable. 
 ICAC’s perspective was that it was improper for developers to exert influence 
over the assessment of their DAs. This was why Morgan’s relationships with 
developers were seen as so damning. Vellar had a different perspective: he said he was 
entitled to express an opinion about who assessed his DAs (212–213). “Expressing an 
opinion” frames the intervention quite differently from “exerting influence.” 
 Oxley, presented with a statement he had made to Vellar, interpreted it  as 
meaning something different from the words — namely  his intent in using the words 
(502–503). Oxley  said his private meetings with Vellar were about ongoing 
development in Wollongong, not about Vellar’s Quattro development (514). (For 
Oxley’s perspective on the corruption scandal, see East (2009).)
 Joe Scimone paid Younan $30,000. He preferred not to call this bribery but 
rather “stupidity” (910; Trenwith 2008, 4 March).
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Opponents of corruption need to counter corruption-friendly interpretations and 
emphasise their own. That means exposing lies and presenting the truth, explaining 
the consequences of corruption behaviour, pinpointing those most responsible, and 
using frameworks and language that highlight problems. 
 In Wollongong, the ICAC inquiry, media coverage and citizen action led to a 
change of interpretation, from a development frame to a corruption frame. The 
development frame looked at local planning issues through the lens of what was good 
for development, “good” meaning what helped new projects obtain approval. The 
emphasis was on outcomes — buildings built. The corruption frame looked instead at 
the process, especially at who was involved in decision-making and whether the 
process served private rather than the public interest.
 I have described four interpretation techniques — lying, minimising, blaming 
and framing — that  can be used to reduce concern about corruption. These techniques 
affect those who use them by explaining actions in legitimate or justifiable terms. The 
power of these techniques was revealed by  the persistence with which those testifying 
before ICAC stuck to their own way of seeing the world despite striking evidence 
showing the inappropriateness of their actions. Interpretation techniques can also 
affect others: framing actions as acceptable makes it much harder to challenge them. 
The implication is straightforward: opponents of corruption need to expose lies, show 
the serious impacts of corrupt behaviour, pin responsibility  on those centrally 
involved, and shift to a frame of honesty versus corruption.
Official channels
Official channels include complaint and grievance procedures, ad hoc inquiries, 
expert panels, ombudsmen, auditor-generals, anti-corruption commissions, courts — 
any formal process that promises to address an organisational or social problem. In an 
ideal world, official channels work, so referring a problem to one or more of them is 
the best way to deal with it. However, in practice, when perpetrators are powerful, 
official channels often give only an appearance of justice without the substance. 
 Whistleblowers commonly make reports to watchdog agencies in the 
expectation that their matter will be dealt with effectively, but in practice this happens 
all too infrequently (De Maria 1999; Devine 2004; Martin 2003). Even the most 
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committed agencies have inadequate resources combined with onerous reporting 
requirements, which mean they  can deal with only a fraction of potential problems. 
Furthermore, formal processes usually take a long time and remove matters from the 
public gaze, causing outrage to decline.
 When governments are themselves criminal or corrupt, they can use official 
channels to maximum effect, giving the appearance of concern and action while 
dampening public reactions. After the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, when white 
police killed about a hundred black protesters, the South African government set up an 
inquiry  that largely exonerated the police (Frankel 2001). After the Dili massacre in 
1991, when hundreds of East Timorese protesters were killed, the Indonesian military 
and government each set up  inquiries that imposed token penalties on a few soldiers 
(Kohen 1999: 170–172). After the exposure of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in 2004, 
the US government charged quite a few soldiers with crimes, but no higher officials 
were indicted, there were no independent inquiries, no war crimes charges and no 
hearings on television (Gray and Martin 2007).
 When criminals do not run the government, they have a more difficult time 
using official channels to their advantage. Nevertheless, this can still happen when 
government bodies have little incentive to tackle the problems vigorously, which may 
be due to criminal influence at  higher levels, worries about possible pay-backs or fear 
of bad publicity. In such circumstances, formal investigations and procedures may 
give the appearance of official concern while limiting popular mobilisation against 
corrupt activities. Official processes are usually slow, procedural and complex, 
discouraging public interest and involvement.
 Whether official channels provide a solution to corruption problems or operate 
to minimise public outrage — or both — is an empirical issue: each case needs to be 
examined. Generally speaking, the more systematic, organised and entrenched the 
corruption, the less likely official channels are to be effective. The point here is that 
official channels should not automatically be assumed to provide the solution. 
 The Wollongong case illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of official 
channels. Conventional processes within council were shown to be inadequate or 
compromised. For example, complaints about Morgan’s relationships with developers 
were ignored: John Gilbert, Morgan’s superior, did nothing about two separate 
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complaints (474, 475). Morgan herself ran ethics programmes for other staff while 
Zanotto, a councillor named by  ICAC, was chair of the Audit and Governance 
Committee for the council’s code of conduct. When Oxley resigned, one of the 
conditions he requested and obtained was that council pay for his legal assistance at 
the ICAC hearings. Meanwhile, the council abolished neighbourhood committees, an 
avenue for community involvement. It was the failure of regular anti-corruption 
processes that justified ICAC’s intervention.
 On the surface, the Wollongong investigation would seem to be a triumph of 
ICAC, the epitome of an anti-corruption official channel. Indeed it must be seen as 
one of ICAC’s greatest successes, not only exposing corruption in Wollongong but 
also in raising awareness of local government corruption more widely.
 The impact of the ICAC investigation was due to two main factors: ICAC’s 
careful covert collection of data and extensive media coverage, abetted by the 
salacious facets of the case. ICAC’s decision to hold open hearings and to publish 
transcripts and reports helped transform what might  otherwise have been a low-key 
operation into a popular sensation. The public exposures led people to speak out about 
other problems and a receptive media to report them, for example about Labor Party 
branch-stacking in Wollongong (Besser 2008). 
 Rodney Tiffen (1999), in his study of major investigative inquiries and 
commissions in Australia, found that those with the greatest reform impact used the 
media as a form of rolling exposé to amplify the impact of investigatory disclosures. 
ICAC’s Wollongong inquiry fits this model. But only  a few inquiries proceed this 
way; most have little public impact, serving more to dampen than ignite public 
concern.
 The publicity about corruption in Wollongong stimulated the council — in its 
final days before being dismissed — to reverse previous decisions. It revoked the 
agreement to pay Oxley’s legal fees, dismissed Zanotto as chair of the Audit and 
Governance Committee and set up a new ethics committee (Cox 2008, 4 March). It 
also moved to reinstate neighbourhood committees, although this did not  happen 
under the administrators who took over from the elected councillors.
 However, ICAC’s investigation had limits. Its probe into local government 
corruption revealed links to actions by state parliamentarians and leading figures in 
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the Labor Party. Joe Scimone worked at Wollongong Council, eventually on a high 
salary  of $168,000 as sustainability  officer. Complaints were made against him for 
sexual harassment. Gilbert received complaints about Scimone, which he dealt with 
by talking to Scimone (486). Despite this, Council manager Rod Oxley gave Scimone 
a glowing reference for a new job. Scimone obtained a $200,000 post in the Maritime 
Authority, overseen by a member of state cabinet, Joe Tripodi, a well-known Labor 
Party figure commonly  called a powerbroker, and a long-time friend of Scimone’s. 
Tripodi claimed he was not  involved in the decision to hire Scimone at the Maritime 
Authority. ICAC decided this was not a matter for investigation. (Scimone was later 
dismissed from the Maritime Authority.)
 The process for prosecuting individuals involved in corrupt conduct was very  
slow. It was well over a year after the February  2008 hearings before ICAC gave 
briefs of evidence to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to consider. A 
newspaper report stated, “If charges are laid and individuals fight the charges, the 
court battles could stretch out  for years” (Roderick 2009). As of July 2010, only five 
individuals had been tried, with the DPP still considering whether to lay charges 
against six others, including Morgan, Vellar and Scimone (Roderick 2010). As of 
April 2011, Morgan and Scimone were still to be charged (Tonkin 2011, 16 April).
 ICAC’s targets were at the local government level, in Wollongong. Whenever 
the links spilled into state-level politics, ICAC seemed to pull back. Its decisions not 
to investigate individuals were taken as giving the all-clear for those individuals. For 
example, following revelations that Noreen Hay, member of state parliament for 
Wollongong, had connections with Vellar, the premier Morris Iemma stood her down 
from her position as Parliamentary Secretary  for Health; after ICAC said she was not 
a person of interest, the premier reinstated her (Allely  2008; see also Christodoulou 
2008, 25 July). Politicians and the media frequently  interpreted ICAC saying someone 
was not a person of interest as meaning ICAC had cleared them (e.g., Cox 2008, 30 
July); ICAC’s contrary interpretation — saying someone was not an “affected person” 
in relation to the Wollongong inquiry was not equivalent to clearing them — was only 
occasionally reported (Christodoulou 2008, 31 July). 
 Others expressed concern about ICAC’s fixation on low-level corruption. 
Quentin Dempster, a journalist for ABC television with a long-term interest in 
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corruption (Dempster 1997), was quoted as saying about ICAC, “After Wollongong 
council corruption was exposed, everyone wants to know why it has not been 
pursuing the evidentiary trail up to Macquarie Street [New South Wales state 
government] to determine if the slush-funding of the NSW branch of the Labor Party 
by property developers and other vested interests represents serious and systemic 
corrupt conduct” (Denholm and Salusinszky 2008). Subsequent media investigations 
revealed links between developers and the Labor Party going much further than 
Wollongong (Frew et al. 2008). Many commentators painted the state Labor 
government as both incompetent and corrupt (Birmingham 2009–10).
 Furthermore, even ICAC’s commitment to exposing corruption in Wollongong 
was questioned. Councillor Andrew Anthony revealed that he had made several 
complaints to ICAC years before, but had been fobbed off (McInerney 2008, 7 
March). Michael Organ, formerly a federal member of parliament for an electorate in 
Wollongong, wrote, “Many in the community have known about council corruption 
for years but their concerns have been largely ignored by the council, politicians and 
authorities such as the NSW Ombudsman’s office and ICAC” (Organ 2008).
 The Wollongong exposé led to calls to ban political donations. In March 2008, 
state premier Morris Iemma promised to reform the system of political donations 
(Clennell 2008, 22 March). But little of substance came from this and later 
pronouncements: months later, the state government retreated from Iemma’s promise 
(Clennell 2008, 7 November; Smith 2008). The promises seemed intended to calm 
public concern: the problem would seem less urgent if politicians were going to do 
something about it. This illustrates a typical weakness of official channels: they 
appear to be responding to problems when actually little happens. In other words, they 
may be more show than substance. 
 Elections for local government offices were scheduled for September 2008. In 
the wake of the revelations about  corruption in the Labor Party, with four councillors 
named by ICAC and extensive media coverage about dubious dealings by other Labor 
Party figures, it seemed likely  Labor would lose the Wollongong elections. ICAC, 
however, recommended that the entire elected council be dissolved and replaced by 
administrators — and this is exactly what the state Labor government did. The four 
Labor councillors who were named by ICAC lost their positions, but so did all other 
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nine councillors, including those without taint. The official response to exposures of 
corruption in the Labor Party  thus limited the damage to Labor in Wollongong. The 
administrators were appointed to run council until the next scheduled elections after 
2008. 
 Information about corruption in Wollongong stimulated the creation of two 
citizens’ groups. These groups can be considered alternatives to official channels: they 
each promoted citizen participation in decision-making, both as a means of limiting 
corruption and as an end in itself, as a desirable facet of democracy.
 Reclaim Our City  (ROC) is an action and lobbying group made up of a variety 
of individuals from trade unions, resident groups, indigenous and other communities. 
It sees itself as an umbrella organisation, with participants representing diverse 
constituencies. ROC’s first major event was a public meeting on 8 April 2008, not 
long after the ICAC hearings concluded. The notice for the meeting stated “If you 
want to have your say and join with other members of the community to demand a 
new direction for our city, one that respects our natural and cultural heritage, that is 
free of corruption and acts in the best interests of the residents, come along to this 
meeting and join the campaign.” From this statement, it is clear that ROC has broader 
aims than just anti-corruption: it is concerned with citizen empowerment as a means 
to limit corruption but more widely to make citizens players in local decision-making.
 ROC has three stated principles: to have an elected local government with 
anti-corruption processes, to reconstitute neighbourhood committees recognised by 
local government, and to promote appropriate development for the community, not 
just developers. The group took up several issues. One was a plan for developing 
Wollongong Harbour, being promoted by the state government. ROC demanded 
genuine citizen participation in the decision-making process, challenging the state 
government over an invitation for tenders and the likelihood of a facade of 
consultation. ROC’s Hands Off the Harbour campaign involved writing letters to 
politicians, making submissions to Wollongong Council, organising a petition, 
running a newspaper advertisement, and organising a public meeting. Another issue 
was Wollongong Town Hall: ROC joined other groups in opposing its demolition.
 ROC also put effort into promoting neighbourhood committees, pushing to 
have the council reconstitute them and provide funding to support them. A key 
Resistance Studies Magazine 2012-01     From: rsmag.org
25
demand was that  neighbourhood committees should see all DAs in their area before 
approval, as had been the practice in the past.
 ROC’s initiatives provided a challenge to corruption in a way quite different 
from ICAC. Rather than rely on formal processes, ROC’s approach is to make citizens 
more aware and involved. This is a challenge to secrecy and insider operations in 
which corruption flourishes. ROC’s Hands Off the Harbour campaign sought to 
institute citizen scrutiny  into a development process that restricted participation to 
developers and government departments. The harbour is an emotive issue for many 
people in Wollongong and thus an ideal issue for mobilising popular concern.
 The second group was Wollongong Against Corruption (WAC). It was formed 
prior to the ICAC hearings due to concern about corruption in the development 
process and, more specifically, the way  harassment complaints against a leading 
Labor figure in Wollongong Council — Joe Scimone — had been dealt with. The 
hearings led to a surge of involvement in WAC. 
 WAC’s goals are set out in the “Wollongong Charter for Ethics and Good 
Governance,” with five principles: “decentralised decision making; community 
participation in decision making processes; transparency of process; accountability  of 
officials; effective and accessible appeals processes.” The thrust of the charter is to 
involve residents in local decision-making, including about  planning, as an end in 
itself and as a way of controlling corruption. 
 WAC’s activities have a fair bit in common with ROC’s: holding meetings, 
making submissions, campaigning on particular development issues, and organising 
demonstrations. WAC, like ROC, is concerned with corruption but has a much wider 
brief: promoting a more participatory politics in Wollongong, with citizens involved 
in decision-making in a more direct fashion than just as voters.
 Compared to ROC, WAC’s style has been somewhat more strident, with its 
demands articulated prominently in the public domain. On 1 April 2008 — though not 
as an April Fool’s joke — WAC organised a “Freedom Train and People’s 
Delegation,” with participants taking the train to Sydney and joining a protest outside 
NSW state parliament. On 13 September 2008, when local government elections were 
held across the state, but not in Wollongong, WAC organised a march and rally in 
downtown Wollongong and a mock ballot with the choices being corruption or 
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democracy  (Apap 2008, 15 September). The theme of democracy denied was 
prominent in speeches on the day. 
 Although the Wollongong investigation was one of ICAC’s triumphs, by no 
means everyone was satisfied with the outcome. WAC organised a one-day 
conference on 16 August 2008 with the theme “Making community democracy 
work” (Apap 2008, 18 August). Keynote speaker John Hatton, a former member of 
state parliament — elected as an independent, not affiliated with any political party — 
and noted anti-corruption campaigner, declaimed against ICAC’s shortcomings in not 
tackling systemic corruption. Hatton facilitated a discussion at the conference at 
which one person after another complained about ICAC for not initiating 
investigations despite complaints made to it.
 Many WAC members decried both the shortcomings of ICAC in restraining a 
wider exposure of corruption and the imposition of administrators as preventing an 
expansion of citizen participation. Believing ICAC’s terms of reference were too 
narrow, a central demand by WAC was for a royal commission into corruption, 
looking for inspiration to a few crusading commissions such as the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
in Queensland. In other words, WAC both criticised and challenged one official 
channel, the ICAC inquiry, and advocated a different potential official channel, a 
royal commission. As noted earlier, royal commissions and other major government-
initiated inquiries usually — but not always — serve government agendas and 
dampen citizen outrage. In practice, WAC’s call for a royal commission seems mainly 
to have served a rhetorical purpose: the state Labor government was never likely  to 
set up an independent and probing investigation into corruption given the number of 
key Labor figures likely to be implicated.
 Community mobilisation is a powerful challenge to entrenched corruption. In 
tactical terms, civic coalitions can harness sources of information that expose 
problems, cutting through methods of cover-up, thereby gaining more support. 
Through popular participation of a broad cross-section of the community, they 
validate their own cause and counter techniques of devaluation. They can articulate 
the demand for honest governance, challenging corruption-tolerant interpretations. 
They  are an alternative to official channels. Finally, through their numbers and 
prominence, they can help in resisting intimidation.
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 There are a number of episodes of popular mobilisation linked to challenging 
corruption on a national scale, for example the 1986 people power movement in the 
Philippines that ended the corrupt  rule of President Ferdinand Marcos, the 1997 
campaign in Turkey by the Citizen Initiative for Constant Light, and the Egyptian 
groups Shayfeen.com, formed in 2005, and its successor Egyptians Against 
Corruption (Beyerle 2011; Beyerle and Hassan 2009). The activities of ROC and 
WAC show the possibilities for popular mobilisation to challenge local corruption.
 The usual approaches to corruption rely on institutional power, such as market 
mechanisms and government regulations; ICAC is an example of such institutional 
anti-corruption power. ROC and WAC, as well as examples from other countries, 
show that by  harnessing popular participation there is the potential for a different 
source of power against corruption: civic power. Citizens can wield this power 
directly as well as seeking to activate institutional power. 
Intimidation and bribery
Corrupt operators often attempt to reduce opposition through a combination of threats, 
attacks and reprisals on the one hand and incentives on the other. In ruthless criminal 
operations, intimidation includes bombings, beatings and killings, including attacks 
on family  members. Lesser forms of intimidation include threats, bullying, damage to 
property, and petty  harassment. Bribery can include payments in cash or various 
possibilities in kind including watches, cars, travel, scholarships, club memberships, 
promotions and jobs. After someone is introduced to criminal operations, the 
possibilities of intimidation increase: someone who has participated in a beating can 
be set up for arrest. 
 Intimidation, by causing fear, reduces the potential for popular action, 
sometimes by discouraging open opposition to corruption and sometimes by helping 
hide what is going on: intimidation has a close link with cover-up. Bribery encourages 
those closest to the action to join in or keep quiet in the hope of benefits.
 In the Wollongong corruption scandal, there are no reports of murder: 
intimidation did not take more extreme forms. Instead, it mainly involved pressure to 
approve DAs, or otherwise do what was expected from higher up, with an 
accompanying fear of losing one’s job. The other main form was bullying.
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 Beth Morgan testified that General Manager Rod Oxley put pressure on staff 
to do what he wanted: “Personally  I felt  that you either had to do what Rod wanted on 
a DA, and generally that was to approve it. If not, either he would make the decision, 
which he had done — has done on other occasions when staff had wanted to — when 
I and other staff had wanted to refuse applications, that you either went along with 
that, or else your career was effectively over at Wollongong City Council and he did 
the best he could and got rid of you” (54–55). 
 Morgan eventually decided to tell the truth to ICAC, even though she felt 
frightened (162). She had good reason to feel this way: it  was dramatically  revealed at 
the hearings that Vellar asked Younan to threaten Morgan, essentially to prevent her 
speaking out (631–633; McInerney  2008, 28 February): Morgan hadn’t previously 
known about  this action by her former lover Vellar. Morgan also felt threatened by 
Scimone (166), against whom there were several bullying complaints (485–486; 
Trenwith 2008, 27 February). 
 Others besides Morgan had raised concerns about Oxley’s role. Planner Mike 
Mouritz had written that he resigned because of Oxley’s interference (189). Planner 
David Broyd left because of interference and a “clash of values” (379, 393; Cox 2008, 
23 February). Planner John Gilbert said he felt his job was at risk (406) and that 
Oxley’s pressure was a source of staff turnover (407): he himself considered leaving, 
in part because of Oxley (472). (For Oxley’s perspective, see East (2009).)
 ICAC interviewed relatively  few individuals; it  is reasonable to presume that 
many other council workers could have given similar stories of interference and 
bullying. In all these examples, pressure was exerted inside council, with job security, 
promotion prospects and job satisfaction being prime vulnerabilities for those 
affected. 
 Perhaps the word “intimidation” is too strong to describe some of the 
pressures that  workers experienced. For some, it might better be described as a choice 
between going along with the flow and having working life become more difficult  — 
and exceedingly stressful.
 It is usually very hard to obtain information about the forms and extent of 
intimidation, because those targeted often legitimately  fear that by speaking out they 
would become subject to further attacks — as happened to Morgan. In this way also, 
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intimidation and cover-up are linked. One of the most potent ways to challenge 
intimidation is to expose it.
 According to a news story, councillor Andrew Anthony wrote to ICAC saying 
“that he had been the subject of repeated threats from Labor councillors and that  he 
feared for his safety” (McInerney 2008, 7 March). (ICAC replied that this should be 
treated as a disciplinary matter using the council’s code of conduct.) After the ICAC 
hearings, Anthony went public about the threats.
 Some members of WAC received death threats in the post. This worried them, 
to say the least, but they were not deterred from their efforts. An additional response 
would have been to put images of the threat letters on the WAC website. Exposing 
intimidation can serve to generate greater support.
Conclusion
The Wollongong saga reveals tactics used by  those implicated in corrupt operations 
and tactics used by opponents of corruption. To minimise public outrage, perpetrators 
used cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, intimidation and bribery. The other tactic 
commonly used by powerful perpetrators, official channels, was not at the formal 
disposal of the corrupt operators. Indeed, the investigation and hearings by  an official 
body, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, broke open the case. Even so, 
both ICAC and the state government acted to prevent expanding the anti-corruption 
campaign more widely. Neither took any action to encourage mobilisation of citizen 
groups against corruption.
 Nevertheless, the ICAC exposures combined with extensive media coverage 
stimulated the formation of one local group, Reclaim Our City, and gave tremendous 
impetus to the already-formed group Wollongong Against Corruption. The efforts of 
ICAC, the media and these groups illustrate methods of increasing outrage by 
opposing the five outrage-minimisation methods, namely by exposure of the problem, 
validation of targets, interpretation of activities as corrupt, mobilisation of support 
without reliance on official channels, and resisting intimidation and bribery.
 Corrupt operators sometimes have supporters throughout the highest  reaches 
of society, in what can be called institutionalised corruption, and can use all five 
methods of inhibiting outrage. In smaller-scale local corruption, such as at 
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Wollongong, operators do not have such easy support from above, which means they 
cannot so easily use the methods of devaluation and reinterpretation. In such cases, 
corruption is officially illegal and condemned. Cover-up  becomes a prime method, 
devaluation is mainly restricted to those close to the action, reinterpretation has to 
occur within codes that are publicly acceptable, official channels become a double-
edged sword and intimidation and bribery have to be targeted, otherwise they may be 
counterproductive. These features are apparent in the Wollongong case: cover-up was 
crucial to continuation of operations; devaluation was limited in extent; 
reinterpretation took place within the rhetoric of supporting development; one official 
channel, ICAC, helped break open the case but also limited its expansion, while 
another official channel, the state government, tried to limit political damage from the 
exposures; and intimidation and bribery were narrowly targeted, with the wider public 
not being directly affected.
 When serious corruption occurs, citizen mobilisation is a powerful antidote. 
Looking at ways to expand this mobilisation provides a recipe for action. This leads 
directly to the five methods of increasing outrage.
 Analysing tactics also provides a way of judging the seriousness of corruption. 
When operators rely  primarily on cover-up and can be brought to account through 
exposure, the corruption is not entrenched. On the other hand, when anti-corruption 
campaigners are publicly denigrated and physically attacked and when official 
agencies go through the motions but do not make serious inroads against corrupt 
operations, the corruption is more institutionalised.
 The normal inclination of governments is to maintain control of anti-
corruption efforts, using laws, police and various agencies. Yet, all too often, these 
efforts are inadequate and become implicated in corruption themselves. A mobilised 
public is a powerful anti-corruption force. For citizen activists, paying attention to the 
tactics for increasing outrage can be a useful framework for guiding campaigns.
Postscript
In 2008, the state government dismissed the entire elected Wollongong Council and 
installed three administrators instead, to run things until the next  election. Before 
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leaving their jobs, the administrators established detailed policies to prevent a 
recurrence of corruption (Grennan 2011). 
 Elections were scheduled for 3 September 2011, with a new voting system to 
elect 13 councillors: four councillors elected from each of three wards, with the lord 
mayor elected separately by the entire electorate. Each of the three largest national 
political parties, Liberals, Labor and Greens, put up candidates. There were also 
numerous independent candidates. A total of 83 candidates ran for the 13 positions, 
with an optional preferential ballot system.
 One candidate for lord mayor was of special significance: Rod Oxley, 
previously  general manager of Wollongong Council. ICAC found that Oxley had 
allowed corruption to occur but did not recommend that he be charged with any 
offence. Oxley defended his actions and reputation in a book titled Named and 
Shamed (East, 2009). His run for lord mayor was interpreted by some as a further 
attempt to overcome the stigma of corruption.
 If so, he was spectacularly unsuccessful. Though more widely  known than 
most of the other candidates, he received less than 3% of the primary vote. Indeed, 
voters seemed to prefer candidates with no connection to the previous council. Two 
members of the previous elected council, Alice Cartan and Andrew Anthony — who 
had not been implicated in corruption — received few first-preference votes for lord 
mayor. The winner was an independent candidate, Gordon Bradbery, a popular 
minister in the Uniting Church, known for his stands on social justice. However, in 
the ward elections, voters mainly  supported the three major parties, with independents 
faring poorly. One exception was Vicki Curran, a key figure in Wollongong Against 
Corruption, who was elected as an independent.
 During the election campaign, there was much comment about the corruption 
scandal, in part  stimulated by news concerning its central figures. A month before the 
election date, the Director of Public Prosecutions announced that  planner Beth 
Morgan would not be charged over 24 of 27 matters recommended by  ICAC; three 
matters remained outstanding (Tonkin 2011, 2 August). Developer Frank Vellar was 
found guilty of three charges and given a two-year good behaviour bond concerning 
two of them, with a decision on a fourth charge deferred (Tonkin 2011, 27 August). 
ICAC (2011) posts on its website the status of its recommendations for prosecution.
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 Just across the street from Wollongong’s Council building, where some of the 
central events in the corruption scandal occurred, sits the Illawarra Performing Arts 
Centre (IPAC). Merrigong Theatre Company — which manages IPAC — worked in 
conjunction with another company, Version 1.0, to produce a play about the events. It 
was titled “The Table of Knowledge” after the table, outside a kebab shop in 
Wollongong, where key figures in the drama — including Oxley, Morgan and Vellar 
— had met.
 To avoid being sued for defamation, the play was ingeniously built  around text 
from public documents, including ICAC transcripts and Oxley’s book. By 
coincidence, the play  opened a couple of days before the election. It was well received 
by audiences and reviewers (Shand 2011; Skinner 2011).
 At the beginning of the play, an actor says to the audience, repeatedly, “This is 
a very unique story, the kind of story that could only  ever take place in a place like 
Wollongong.” Each time, another actor cried out “Strathfield” or “Burwood” or the 
name of some other Australian local government body  where corruption had been 
exposed. The message was clear: this was a story  about Wollongong but it  could just 
as well have been about any number of other places. For the same reason, this 
analysis of corruption tactics is a Wollongong story but has many general lessons for 
dealing with corruption.
Appendix 1: Key figures 
Staff at Wollongong Council
Beth Morgan, senior planner. She admitted to having affairs with developers Frank 
Vellar, Glen Tabak and Michael Kollaras when she was handling their DAs
John Gilbert, planner. Beth Morgan’s supervisor
David Broyd, planner. He left Council in 2005. Critical of pressure from Rod Oxley
Joe Scimone, manager. Accused of sexual harassment. Left Council for a job with the 
NSW Maritime Authority
Rod Oxley, general manager, in charge of the DA process
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Councillors (elected local government members)
Val Zanotto, Kiril Jonovski, Zeki Esen and Frank Gigliotti, Labor Party members 
named as persons of interest by ICAC
State government
Morris Iemma, premier of NSW
David Campbell, member of state parliament representing the electorate of Keira (in 
Wollongong); Police Minister in the state government; former Wollongong 
councillor and Lord Mayor 





Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)
Jerrold Cripps, Commissioner. Presided over the Wollongong Council hearings
Noel Hemmings, lawyer, who did most of the questioning in ICAC hearings
Others
Ray Younan and Gerald Carroll, convicted criminals who posed as ICAC personnel
Appendix 2: The allegations
Several types of corrupt or inappropriate conduct were alleged to have occurred in 
Wollongong. For ICAC’s findings and recommendations see ICAC (2008b).
Conflict of interest
The most dramatic instances were Beth Morgan’s affairs with developers while she 
was assessing their DAs.
 Another example was general manager Rod Oxley meeting with developers — 
notably Frank Vellar — outside of his office, in violation of Council policies. When 
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Council planners rejected Vellar’s DAs, he would go to Oxley  who would follow up 
with managers.
 Councillor Val Zanotto made money out of a purchase of land while he was 
part of the council decision-making process.
Interference with procedures
Oxley was alleged to interfere with processes for handling DAs, usually to push 
through what he thought was a desirable project.
Violation of procedures
Morgan approved a DA although it greatly exceeded planning guidelines for height 
and floor-space ratio. 
Releasing confidential information
Morgan gave Vellar internal council documents, at his request. After Vellar received 
confidential rezoning information, he made an unconditional offer on property  the 
same day.
Bribery 
Vellar gave Morgan — while she was assessing his DA — many gifts.
 Vellar claimed that three councillors had solicited a cash bribe in return for 
supporting his DA. 
 A number of individuals — among them Vellar, Morgan, Scimone and Zanotto 
— paid Younan and Carroll a total of half a million dollars to avoid being named in 
ICAC investigations.
Favours
Scimone overruled his staff in giving Tabak, a friend, a $200,000 reduction in a 
council fee.
Donations
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Companies and individuals made donations to politicians. For example, developer 
Tabak made donations to state politician Noreen Hay, to the Labor Party and to the 
Liberal Party, among others. Donations are legal but can lead to an expectation or 
perception that favours may be done in return for them.
Caucusing
The Labor Party  uses a caucus system: Labor members of council, meeting separately, 
decided on a position, after which all members were bound to support  the position in 
the full council meeting. This meant that four Labor councillors could control the 
council: if they voted as a bloc in the Labor caucus, the other three Labor members 
would have to support the decision, and the seven-member Labor group then had a 
majority  of the 13 councillors. Noel Hemmings of ICAC argued that caucusing this 
way was a form of corruption (868; McInerney 2008, 4 March).
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